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In recent decades, more and more countries in the Western world have introduced higher 
requirements on language and civics skills for the granting of citizenship. This tendency has 
been referred to by Joppke (2007) as ‘the civic integration policy trend’. 
     In the UK, citizenship testing has been an established concept since the 1980s, and the 
British political discourse on immigration can be said to be in line with the civic integration 
policy. Sweden on the other hand, is one of the few countries in Europe lacking citizenship 
tests, and has thus, so far, been considered a deviant from this trend. 
     This study explores and compares arguments concerning citizenship testing in the political 
discourse of Sweden and the UK using critical discourse analysis. It will analyse political 
proposals and announcements published between the years of 2003-2018 by the Swedish and 
British governments. 
     The Swedish and British political discourses were found to differ in certain aspects, for 
instance in regards of the themes of immigration control, selectivism and elitism. However, 
common traits were also found, which, in combination with an increased engagement in this 
issue, may imply a growing influence of the civic integration policy in the Swedish debate.  
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1. Introduction 
In the Western world, there is a widespread belief that a common language, and to some 
extent a common culture, is important for national cohesion. Many countries speak of the 
necessity of language learning for immigrants, as knowledge in the majority language is 
believed to give access to democratic rights, political and societal participation, as well as to 
unifying communities. Although most agree on the positive effects of a common language, 
there are varying views on how language learning for immigrants should be encouraged and 
executed.  
     Today, citizenship testing1 exists in almost all countries in the Western world 
(Globaliseringsrådet, 2008:34). In these countries, applicants must demonstrate sufficient 
knowledge in the majority language and/or culture, history and values of the country of 
residence. Implementation of citizenship testing has been met both by positive and negative 
criticism. The advocates claim that this will function as an incentive for language learning and 
integration, which, in the long run, will lead to a stronger national cohesion, while the 
opponents believe that it has the opposite effect; excluding groups rather than creating an 
equal and unified society. Critics have also claimed that citizenship tests are often used for 
immigration control (Joppke, 2007:5) rather than as a means of integration, aiming to reduce 
the number of new citizens, or to exclude those considered ‘low-skilled’ or ‘un-adaptable’.  
     In recent decades, more and more countries have introduced citizenship testing or have 
extended already existing demands. This pattern of policy changes in Europe, illustrating 
what Borevi (2014:715) calls a retreat of multiculturalism, is discussed by Joppke (2007) as 
part of a ‘civic integration policy trend’. The British policy on citizenship is seemingly in line 
with the general trend in Europe. In the UK, citizenship tests have existed since the 1980s, 
and have been extended and modified several times. Sweden, however, is one of the few 
countries that has not yet introduced language or civics testing for new citizens, and has thus 
been considered a deviant from this trend (Borevi, 2014). In Sweden, voices opposing an 
implementation have up until the previous decade dominated the political discourse. Yet, 
lately, the debate concerning language testing has started to change. Several of the largest 
                                                      
1 In this study, the term ‘citizenship testing’ covers both language and civics tests. When these concepts are 
discussed separately, the individual terms will be used.   
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political parties that formerly objected to the idea now speak positively about a potential 
introduction of citizenship testing or language requirements for certain groups of people2.  
     Considering that citizenship testing has been an established concept in the UK for decades, 
while in Sweden the broad engagement in this issue is relatively new, the political discourses 
can be assumed to differ in these two contexts. However, even if proposals concerning an 
introduction of citizenship tests, so far, has been rejected by the Swedish government, the 
growing interest in the issue, raises the question of whether the Swedish debate has crept 
closer to the civic integration policy trend (presumably prevalent in the British debate) in 
recent years.  
 
1.1 Aim 
This study aims to explore and compare arguments concerning citizenship testing in the 
political discourse of Sweden and the UK in the 2000s. The analysis examines 12 Swedish 
parliamentary procedures (Swe. motioner) and 11 UK Government announcements, including 
speeches, news stories, articles, press releases and written statements to Parliament, published 
between 2003-2018, using critical discourse analysis (CDA). This study aspires to identify 
some similarities and disparities in the two political discourses, and to discuss them in their 
social context, especially in line with the concept of ‘the civic integration policy’ as depicted 
by Joppke (2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
2 Some parties have suggested language demands for those newly arrived and unemployed, as a condition for 
continuance of economical allowance. In these cases, language skills are thus not a requirement for citizenship 
per se, but still concern the topic of language demands for immigrants.   
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1.2 Research questions 
The research questions asked in the present study are: 
 
• What characteristics can be seen in the political debates on citizenship testing in 
Sweden and in the UK respectively, during the time period of 2003-2018?   
• How does the Swedish political discourse concerning citizenship testing compare to 
that of the UK? 
• How much does the political discourse in the Swedish proposals deviate from the so 
called ‘civic integration policy trend’, and how visible is the ideology of the same 
policy in the British debate? 
 
1.3 Overview of study 
Section 2 presents some previous research conducted on the topic of citizenship and 
citizenship testing. Firstly it provides some general information, followed by two sections 
presenting research concerning the British and the Swedish debates separately. Section 3 
presents the material and method, and is followed by results and discussion, presented in 
section 4. The final section provides a conclusion of the present study. 
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2. Previous research on citizenship and citizenship testing 
This section will provide background on the topic of citizenship and citizenship testing in 
Europe and in the UK and Sweden. It is quite an extensive overview. However, it was 
considered relevant to provide information about the context in which the material discussed 
in the analysis part of the study occurs. 
 
2.1 The civic integration policy trend in Europe 
Large-scale immigration is a recent phenomenon in Europe compared to for example North 
America and Australia. Piller (2001) claims that therefore, Europe does not have a common 
pattern for integration and citizenship testing (2001:265). Instead, she claims, the laws 
concerning citizenship in European countries are much more dependent upon the countries’ 
independent national ideologies. However, Joppke (2007) identifies a trend having spread 
across Europe in recent decades; namely the emergence of a ‘civic integration policy’, also 
described as a ‘retreat’ of multiculturalism (Borevi, 2014:715).  
     The civic integration policy was developed in the Netherlands in the 1990s, after having 
faced what Joppke calls “one of Europe biggest socioeconomic integration failures” (Joppke, 
2007:5) under a multiculturalist policy. Joppke discusses the civic integration policy as a 
trend of changes of integration policy happening all over Europe. These changes concerned “a 
new insistence that newcomers acquire the language of the host country and learn about its 
history, norms and traditions” (Borevi, 2014:713), “signifying the importance of immigrants 
integrating more fully into the mainstream of society” (Borevi, 2014:715). The viewpoint also 
changed from having considered legal status as an enhancer of integration, to the lack of 
integration being considered as the reason for lack of legal status (Joppke, 2007:8). 
Essentially, it could be described as a move from an integrationist view, towards an 
assimilationist view.  
     This amounts to a paradox between two ideologies (Joppke, 2007:15). Joppke claims that 
many countries officially ascribe to the ‘two-way’ integration policy, citing the EU’s 
“‘common basic principles’ of immigrant integration policy […]: ‘Integration is a dynamic, 
two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the Member 
States’” (Council of the European Union 2004:19, cited in Joppke, 2007:3). This declaration 
states it is not only the ‘newcomer’ who should adjust in an integration process, but also the 
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receiving society. This, however, contradicts the civic integration policy, that places most 
responsibility of integration, if not all, on the newcomer (Joppke, 2007:4). The newcomer is 
also expected and rewarded on assimilating into the majority society: “[i]t thus has quite 
literally become true that ‘everyone is responsible for his own integration’” (Joppke, 2007:7). 
Joppke further argues that: 
[t]his stance [the ‘two-way’ integration] has become a platitude, but one should not 
therefore forget its extreme improbability. Ever since the transition from nomadic to 
settled life in the Neolithic Revolution, the maxim that settled populations had put 
forward to newcomers was that they should adapt to their ways – ‘when in Rome do 
as the Romans do’. The idea that something as complex and extensive as the 
receiving society, a ‘society’ after all and not just ‘people’, should change in 
response to the arrival of by nature numerically inferior ‘migrants’ is unheard of. 
That a settled society would change as a result of migration is of course inevitable, 
but elevating this into an ethical maxim, a should, is an unprecedented stance to take. 
(Joppke, 2007:3) 
 
Another critique of the civic integration policy is that it could be used as a migration control, 
that would also be likely to make the immigration policy a selective and elitist process 
(Joppke, 2007:5), serving “to weed out nondesirable applicants” (Piller, 2001:268). In this 
policy, it is easy for ‘highly skilled’ migrants to settle, while it becomes increasingly difficult 
for those considered ‘low-skilled’ (Joppke, 2007:8). Joppke, however, does not ascribe these 
views to racism or nationalism, but argues that they are inherent in liberalism itself, although 
stating that it is likely to have an exclusionary and discriminatory effect (Joppke, 2007:15). 
     The civic integration policy seems to be prevalent in the UK, but Sweden is a more 
ambiguous case. Borevi (2014) claims that these ideas are not established in Sweden, which, 
at least in the sense of a law of citizenship testing, has deviated from this tendency. Piller 
states that it is ideology that is the main reason for the opposition among countries lacking 
citizenship testing, drawing on two clear examples: Israel and Sweden. Israel, she claims, 
lacks language demands because a common religion is the strongest factor for national 
belonging, which renders a common language irrelevant (Piller, 2001:265). As for Sweden, 
Piller states that it is the ideology of multiculturalism that has been the main reason for the 
lack of citizenship testing. Borevi (2014) reinforces this stance, stating that since the 1970s, 
Sweden has aimed “to avoid previous forms of ethnic ‘Swedifying’”, and from then on the 
policy has been “oriented towards affirming and supporting immigrants’ ethnic identities” 
(Borevi, 2014:711). She also claims that Sweden has previously shown ‘little engagement’ on 
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the issue of citizenship testing. This will be further explored in this study, discussed in section 
2.3, as well as in the analysis. 
 
2.2 Research on the debate on citizenship testing in the UK 
In the United Kingdom, citizenship testing has existed since 1981, implemented as part of the 
British Nationality Act. The law has since been developed and extended numerous times. A 
debated addition was introduced along with the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum act 
from 2002, which extended the citizenship requirements to include spouses of British citizens, 
who had previously been exempted. This act also introduced the now current Life in the 
United Kingdom test, testing both proficiency in the English language, as well as skills about 
British life, values, history and traditions. The recent debate on citizenship testing in the UK 
has largely been concerned with the different supplements and changes of the current law, 
commonly regarding the content of the tests and the extension of individuals included, as well 
as the reasons preceding and consequences following.  
     Blackledge (2006) discusses the effects of citizenship testing, focusing specifically on the 
extension of the law in 2002. This extension was debated, mainly because of the time of its 
introduction. The act was presented shortly after a particularly turbulent time in the UK, when 
escalated conflicts between the Asian immigrant population and the white British-born 
population lead to race riots in several cities during 2001. Blackledge claims that these events 
were the reason for, or at least heavily influenced, the introduction of the new act 
(Blackledge, 2006:28). As the proposition of an extended language demand was presented in 
direct contact to these incidents, Blackledge claims that the Government presented 
insufficient knowledge in English as the main explanation for the turbulence, and that the 
minority immigrant population were consequently blamed (Blackledge, 2006:38). In other 
words, lacking knowledge in the majority language was constructed as a threat to national 
security and cohesion, and the extension was introduced to present a solution to societal 
problems.  
     According to Blackledge, advocates of language testing only speak of the advantages of 
learning the majority language, arguing for social justice and active societal participation, 
without mentioning actual advantages with the concept of ‘testing’ (Blackledge 2006:39). He 
further argues that problems following a law of citizenship testing are ignored in the political 
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debate, such as the risk of individuals failing the tests being excluded from society. As most 
critics of language testing, Blackledge does not question the favourable impact that language 
is likely to have on integration. He states that many valid arguments about language as an 
important tool in integration are brought forward in the debate, such as the way of facilitating 
participation in society and the overall positive effects of people being able to communicate 
with each other. However, Blackledge claims that there is no clear connection between 
demanding that someone learns a language, and their ability to actually do it (Blackledge 
2006:39). In addition, he argues that it is naïve to claim that knowledge of English would lead 
to acceptance and employment in the new country, because this way of arguing ignores 
factors such as racism and discrimination.  
     Blackledge is thus strongly critical of the idea of language and civic tests, as he believes 
that this system prolongs and reinforces alienation. He claims that the demands are likely to 
exclude entire groups of people, and strip them of the chance to practice their democratic 
rights. He further argues that language testing becomes discriminatory instead of the 
expressed purpose of aiding integration, and that there is a disagreement between the political 
discourse and the law in practice, as the government, while promoting integration and a 
multicultural society, also supports a law, whose consequences would lead to the opposite 
result. 
     Similarly to Blackledge, Han, Starkey and Green (2010) discuss language testing in the 
UK in relation to integration, multiculturalism, assimilation and citizenship. They ask if 
citizenship tests are really introduced out of a genuine will to prepare and integrate new 
citizens, or if it is rather a measure to reduce immigration, and especially the number of 
individuals who are uneducated (Han et al., 2010:66), (which is now evidently an explicit 
argument, as will be discussed in section 6). Han et al. were also interested in finding out how 
students themselves experienced language courses and tests. In order to grasp this, they 
conducted interviews with students and teachers at an ESOL skills for life course in the UK. 
In these interviews, they spoke to 8 students from Somalia, Eritrea, Turkey and Portugal. All 
the students from non-EU countries intended to apply for citizenship in the UK.   
     Han et al. state that the interviewees believed that it was important to learn English as 
residents in the UK and found that both the language- and civics-part of the course were 
relevant and helpful. The students attested that being taught about British society helped them 
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to integrate socially and economically and gave them more confidence to orient themselves in 
society. Han, Starkey and Green (2010) also emphasise that neither teachers nor students 
found the tests discriminatory. With that basis, they conclude that the language demand, 
despite involving some problems, is not as bad as some critics claim. However, from 
Blackledge’s perspective, the fact that there is a natural motivation, appreciation for, and 
value of language courses would not be a valid argument for language testing, as it still leaves 
out the specific benefit of ‘testing’. 
     Han et al. (2010) point out that it is important to separate courses and tests, and they also 
acknowledge that conditions for citizenship could entail the exclusion of certain groups of 
people. On the other hand, they do not believe that the current language policy is meant to 
function as a barrier to immigrants seeking citizenship, partly because the law only demands 
an improvement of the language, in contrast to an absolute standard. Even if they do see a 
potential tendency towards a policy of assimilation, they argue that the ideology behind the 
law is grounded in a belief that knowledge of a national language is important for economic, 
social and political integration (Han et al., 2010:73), benefitting the applicant. They especially 
point to the results of their study, showing that the students themselves did not experience the 
demands as discriminatory.  
     However, Han et al. focus on another issue with the current the policy. In 2006, cutbacks 
were made in the budget for language courses, which meant that the courses, for many people, 
were no longer cost-free. This, they claim, is more likely to lead to discrimination, creating a 
barrier between certain groups of immigrants (Han et al., 2010:64). The teachers interviewed 
in the study believed that those most likely to be affected by the cutbacks were part-time 
working students enrolled in evening courses, a group who, they believed, would not be able 
to afford to pay for the education themselves (Han et al., 2010:70-71). However, somewhat 
surprisingly, Han et al. still argue that it is not unreasonable for the government to claim a 
cost, saying that the students should see the course as an investment. They also maintain that 
this potential discrimination was not a conscious act from the government, but rather an 
unfortunate result of an inevitable cutback in budget.  
     In a more recent study, Byrne also examined the experiences of citizenship applicants in 
the UK (Byrne, 2017), with a fairly different result. Byrne was interested in how applicants 
experienced the content of the tests, as well as the requirement to take it. Similarly to 
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Blackledge, her views on the tests are that they are “an attempt to reassure (Forrtier, 2008: 
101) public anxieties about immigration” (Byrne, 2017:325), as demands on language and 
civics skills have been introduced “at times when immigration is highly politicised.” (Byrne, 
2017:334). She agrees with the view that there has been a change in Europe in the past 10-20 
years, and that countries are starting to question multiculturalism and returning to a more 
assimilationist policy (Byrne, 2017:324). In the following passage she discusses the view on 
immigration in the UK: 
Multicultural tolerance, and celebration of difference, has been blamed for fostering 
too much separation and of being weak in the face of cultural forces hostile to 
Christianity and western culture (Kundnani, 2014). In response to these fears, there 
has been a renewed focus on ‘British values’ – for example, in the recently introduced 
duty of schools to ‘actively promote fundamental British values’ through the 
curriculum. (Byrne, 2017:324) 
 
Byrne (2017) also discusses the altered regulations concerning citizenship testing introduced 
in 2013, which meant that applicants, both for citizenship and permanent residency, had to 
pass both a language and a civics test. Furthermore, she discusses the changes made as 
regards the content of the tests, going from a focus on basic societal skills, to a focus on 
culture, history and values. Byrne claims that this is “thus reflecting the shift to ideas of 
‘earned’ citizenship, where rights can only be granted once they have been demonstrably 
earned” (Byrne, 2017:328). 
     In her study, Byrne found that her interviewees were aware of the fact that they were 
required to know more about for example history, than most British-born citizens (Byrne, 
2017:334), which some, in contrast to those in Han et al.’s study, found to be unfair. In 
relation to this fact, Byrne also discusses the concept of the ‘super citizen’, meaning that new 
citizens in many ways are required to know more about British history and culture than the 
common ‘British-born’ citizen. The standards and requirements are thus higher on those 
newly arrived, than those born in the country. Furthermore, she states that all responsibility of 
successful integration is put on the new citizen, arguing that: “[i]f tests are designed to 
facilitate integration, then it is a one-way model of integration imagined where all the work of 
adaptation is done by the incomers” (Byrne, 2017:334). 
 
  10 
2.3 Research on the debate on citizenship testing in Sweden  
The fact that Sweden has been, and still is, lacking citizenship tests makes the country quite 
unique. It is therefore an interesting topic of examination, and previous research has been 
exploring the reasons for this deviancy, as well as what an implementation of a law 
concerning language and civics tests would mean in a country such as Sweden. The debate on 
citizenship testing has been on-going in Sweden in recent decades, and a number of proposals 
have been presented. Until recently the engagement in these questions was however restricted 
to a few political parties, but lately, several influential Swedish parties are positively 
discussing an introduction of language demands, which implies a change in the political 
discourse. 
     As stated, the situation in Sweden differs from that in the UK. Historically, there was a law 
on language testing in Sweden as well, introduced in 1950. However, the requirements were 
vague, formal tests were lacking, and the law was eventually removed in the beginning of the 
1980s (Globaliseringsrådet, 2008:33). Sweden also underwent a change from the mid 1970s, 
when the country turned from an ideology of assimilation, to one of multiculturalism. From 
then on, the official policy stated that immigrants, who previously had been expected to 
assimilate into the Swedish norms, were allowed and encouraged to keep their cultural 
identity, as pluralism was embraced (Milani, 2008:29). Piller claims that this ideology is 
contradictory to the idea of citizenship tests: “Sweden conceives of the nation as a community 
of citizens with the same obligations and rights, and, in conjunction with the official ideology 
of multiculturalism, this makes a Swedish language requirement for naturalization 
dispensable” (2001:265).  
     So far the Swedish government have kept to this presumed ideology, rejecting proposals 
about both language requirements and tests on Swedish culture, history and values, although 
these have continued to appear (Milani, 2008:30). During the 1994 elections, the discussion 
was brought up by The Moderate Party (Swe. Nya Moderaterna) and an investigation about 
citizenship laws was initiated three years later, where the concept of language demands was 
examined. The report established that language and civics tests should not be connected to 
citizenship because of the varying preconditions among applicants, which was considered to 
be beyond the control of the individual, concluding that this would have meant an unfair 
assessment (Milani, 2008:30). The debate went on and proposals kept on appearing, in the 
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beginning mostly initiated by the Liberals (Swe. Liberalerna)3, but more recently ever more 
frequently by a wider range of parties.  
     In 2007, the Swedish government initiated a report called Language, requirements and 
citizenship [my translation] (transl.1) 4. This report is a review of the different views on 
citizenship in Western countries, and laws concerning citizenship testing. The aim of the 
report was to see what consequences an introduction of a language demand for citizenship 
could have in Sweden, and asks if it is likely that a language demand could lead to increased 
language skills for citizenship applicants. The conclusion was that a language demand could 
possibly increase the knowledge of Swedish among the relevant group, but that it would also 
have other significant effects. The report concluded that an introduction of a language 
requirement for citizenship would be likely to result in a decrease of citizenship applicants. 
Moreover, echoing the report in 1997, it was considered likely that the applicants’ differing 
backgrounds and preconditions would lead to some being favoured, while others would be 
disadvantaged (Globaliseringsrådet, 2008:51). The report also states that it is important to 
consider what integration really means, and to what extent an immigrant should be expected 
to adjust to the majority culture (Globaliseringsrådet, 2008:52), thus again reflecting the 
ideology of multiculturalism, and the abandonment of the assimilation policy. 
     Language, requirements and citizenship also discusses citizenship tests as a generally 
growing trend in connection to the rising influence of right populist parties over the past few 
years, as well as the rising immigration in many countries of people that “by the majority 
population are perceived as (more) unfamiliar [my translation]” (transl. 2), saying: 
With an implicit view that citizenship amounts to a belonging to a national 
community, an increasingly striking ethnic heterogeneity could be viewed as a threat 
to the basic idea itself [my translation] (transl. 3) (Globaliseringsrådet, 2008, s. 48) 
tt      
Essentially the report reasons that the positive effect of citizenship tests would not be worth 
risking the negative ones, and recommends that the government abstain from introducing a 
new law concerning language demands for citizenship applicants.   
                                                      
3 Before 2015, the Liberals (Swe. Liberalerna) were known as the Liberal People’s party (Swe. Folkpartiet 
liberalerna). In this study, they will be referred to only as the Liberal party, regardless of what name was used at 
the time that the discussed material was presented.  
4 All translations in this study are numbered. The original texts can be found in appendix 1.   
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     Milani (2008), who also opposes the idea of an introduction of a language demand in 
Sweden, is in agreement with Blackledge, and believes that language demands would 
contribute to a social division of people, despite the expressed purpose of enhanced 
integration between ‘Swedes’ and ‘immigrants’ (Milani, 2008:31). He also states that a 
proposal of language demands constructs immigrants as problems, and discusses the influence 
of political events on the proposals, such as the emergence of the xenophobic party New 
Democracy (Swe. Ny Demokrati) in Sweden and right-wing populist Danish People’s Party 
(Dk. Danske Folkeparti) in Denmark. However, foremost, he discusses the view of the 
Liberals, as it has been the party most active in this question in Sweden, presenting several 
proposals during the 1990s and 2000s.  
     The view of the Liberals is that citizenship should be “a recognition of having met a set of 
criteria [my translation]” (transl. 4) and that citizenship should be “connected to a certain 
solemnity [my translation]” (transl. 5), met with a ceremonial mark of entry (Motion 
2002/03:Sf226). This is a view that the Language, requirements and citizenship report 
(Globaliseringsrådet, 2008) claim is a common trait for countries with citizenship testing. 
Referring to Bourdieu’s concept of ‘gate-keeping mechanism’ and ‘social frontiers’, Milani 
describes how this view turns citizenship into a social ritual, where individuals who meet the 
criteria are accepted as citizens, while those failing to do so are confirmed as non-citizens. In 
this way, language demands can assign identities and create a wall between those succeeding 
and those failing the tests.  
     This also creates a division between ‘immigrants’, who are forced to take the tests, and 
‘ethnic Swedes’, who are exempted (Milani 2008:41). Milani relates this discussion to the 
idea of ‘imagined community’ and an ‘us’ and ‘them’ construction, where the immigrant 
group is also homogenized, despite being a diverse group both from ethnic, social and 
linguistic perspectives (Milani, 2008:41). Milani echoes the paradox outlined by Joppke 
(2007) and discussed by Blackledge (2006) and Borevi (2014), stating that there is a 
contradiction in the declaration of Sweden as a multicultural and tolerant society, and the 
embracing of the implication of one language and one culture being necessary for Swedish 
citizenship (Milani 2008:47).  
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3. Material & Method 
This section will present and discuss the material used in this study, as well as a broader 
theoretical framework followed by the practical method employed for the analysis. 
 
3.1 Material 
This study uses critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine the political discourse in 
Sweden and the UK, using 23 texts (18235 words), published on the Swedish and British 
governments’ webpages between the years of 2003-2018. The Swedish material (10682 
words) consists of 12 parliamentary procedures (Swe. motioner), i.e. formal proposals by 
individuals or groups in a deliberative assembly, in this case members of various political 
parties. The British material (7753 words) consist of 10 texts categorized as ‘news stories’, 
‘speeches’, ‘press releases’ and ‘written statements to parliament’, published on the 
Government webpage, under the category ‘announcements’, and one extended ‘article’ 
viewed at the UK Government Web Archive. For the full list of texts used, see appendix 2. 
     The Swedish texts are written by members of the following parties: the Moderate Party 
(Swe. Nya Moderaterna, abbreviated M), the Liberals (Swe. Liberalerna, abbreviated L), the 
Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, abbreviated SD) and The Christian Democrats 
(Kristdemokraterna, abbreviated KD). The British announcements are all made by members 
of the Conservative party, under the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition 
government. Thus, all of the used material has been written by right, centre right, or 
nationalist parties or politicians5. This focus is not a conscious choice but a result of 
availability of information, as these seem to be the most frequent debaters of the relevant 
issue.  
     The material has been collected through a search on the Governments’ webpages. The 
selection was made based on estimated relevance, as described below. The search included 
several terms, such as: ‘language requirement’, ‘language demand’, ‘language testing’, 
‘citizenship testing’ etc., in order to find as much relevant text as possible. The results were 
then reviewed and included or excluded in accordance to what was believed to be relevant. If 
                                                      
5 It is worth mentioning that the promotion of citizenship and/or language testing is not restricted to one side of 
the political spectrum in Sweden. In connection to the 2018 general elections, the Social Democrats (S) have 
suggested an introduction of language demands as part of a more restrictive immigration policy. However, as 
these suggestions are very recent, and not yet officially published, they are not included in this study.  
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the proposal centred on, or contained significant bits discussing language or citizenship 
testing, it was included, if not, it was excluded. The material has thus been collected through a 
personal selection, however, relevance was measured based on topic and number of 
‘arguments’, not on opinion or political positioning.  
     It should be noted that there is a difference between a ‘proposal’ and an ‘announcement’ of 
a law/an act that has already been passed. While the announcements show a political 
discourse approved by the British government, the proposal contains political discourse that 
has not (yet) been officially recognized by the Swedish government. It should be remembered 
that there are also opposing forces to the suggestion of citizenship testing in Sweden. 
However, the proposals are picked from various influential parties, and thus make out a 
significant part of the political landscape in Sweden. Both the Swedish and the British 
material thus concern the relevant issue that this study aims to analyse.  
     Another noteworthy factor, as this partly is a comparative analysis of the British and 
Swedish debates, is that the languages of Swedish and English have different positions as 
regards usefulness and status. English, of course, is a powerful world language, widely used 
and spread all over the world, whereas Swedish is a small language, restricted to a minor area 
of the world. It could be argued that a comparison of a language requirement of these two 
languages is problematic because of these factors. The demands of skills in each language 
respectively, might mean different things. Nevertheless, both concern a demand for 
knowledge and skills in a country’s majority language and culture, often because of issues of 
national cohesion and/or integration. 
 
3.2 Method 
The method employed in this study is critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA is an 
interdisciplinary approach concerned with how discourse is connected to hierarchical 
structures. The development of CDA has been influenced by critical analysis and theories 
within ‘Western Marxism’, and scholars such as Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, Mikhail 
Bakhtin and the Frankfurt School (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997:260). These scholars examined 
hegemony and ideology, “and on how the structures and practices of ordinary life routinely 
normalize capitalist social relations” (Forgacs, 1988, in Fairclough & Wodak, 1997:261). The 
modern CDA emerged in the 1970s, and is mostly associated with linguists Ruth Wodak, 
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Teun van Dijk, and foremost Norman Fairclough, whose book Language and power (1989) is 
often considered one of the most influential in the field (Blommaert, 2000: 454).  
     In Fairclough’s famous model for CDA, three interrelated processes of analysis are tied to 
three interrelated dimensions of discourse (Janks, 1997:329). The first one is ‘text’, denoting 
the object of analysis. The second is “the processes by which the object is produced and 
received by human subjects”, i.e. writing, speaking etc. (Janks, 1997:329). The third is “the 
socio-historical conditions that govern these processes” (Janks, 1997:329). These three 
processes are then connected to three different sorts of analysis (Janks, 1997: 329): 
1. text analysis (description) 
2. processing analysis (interpretation) 
3. social analysis (explanation)  
    
 Critique against CDA has often circled around the “issues of interpretation and context” 
(Blommaert, 2000:455). Schegloff claim that “[a]nalysts project their own political biases and 
prejudices onto their data and analyze them accordingly” (Schegloff, 1997, quoted in 
Blommaert, 2000:455), meaning the analyst finds what they want to find, reinforcing that 
which supports their claim, and ignoring residual information (a well-known phenomenon 
referred to as confirmation bias). This is dismissed by Fairclough, as he claims that this may 
be considered an issue in any form of analysis, and is thus a general problem, not a problem 
specific for CDA. He also states that there is no such thing as ‘objectivity’: 
Textual analysis is also inevitably selective: in any analysis, we choose to ask certain 
questions about social events and texts, and not other possible questions […] The 
general point is that there are always particular motivations for choosing to ask 
certain questions about texts and not others […] There is no such thing as an 
‘objective’ analysis of a text … (Fairclough, 2008:14-15) 
 
Fairclough also argues that although an analysis can provide important insight, an analyst can 
never examine all aspects of a text (Fairclough, 2008:14). Fairclough and Wodak see the 
analysis as “dynamic and open”, and states that it is never “finished and authoritative” 
(Fairclough & Wodak, 1997:279), as the context a text occurs in may change or be altered.  
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     CDA studies how power or norms can be exercised, enhanced or maintained by discourse 
and through the use of language, its “principle aim […] [being] to uncover opaqueness and 
power relationships” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997:279). It is commonly engaged in topics 
such as: political discourse, ideology, racism, economic discourse, advertisement and 
promotional culture, media language, gender, institutional discourse, education and literacy 
(Blommaert, 2000:450), domains in which “issues of power asymmetries, exploitation, 
manipulation, and structural inequalities are highlighted” (Blommaert, 2000:451).  
     Discourse is not produced independently of the surrounding world, and cannot be 
understood without knowledge of the specific context in which they occur. Here, the concept 
of intertextuality is vital, denoting the relationship between different texts and discourses. 
According to Fairclough and Wodak, it is important to understand “underlying conventions 
and rules”, both current and historical, in order to properly understand and analyse discourse 
(Fairclough & Wodak, 1997:276). They state that discourse is always related to other 
previously, synchronically and subsequently produced discourse (Fairclough & Wodak, 
1997:276). Simply put, all that is produced relates to its contexts. Intertextuality may either 
mean texts being positively influenced by other texts, assimilating other texts into a new one, 
a dismissal, contradiction or reaction to a previous text, and so on (Fairclough, 2015:37). 
      Related is the concept of recontextualisation. Recontextualisation is the movement, 
reoccurrence or reproduction of texts (i.e. a discourse, an ideology, an idea, an argument), 
from the original context, to a new context (Fairclough, 2015:38), likely with add-ons or 
alterations. This process can also be referred to as a ‘textual chain’ (Blackledge, 2006:26). A 
textual chain may invoke a change of meaning or a change of power; “in the 
recontextualisation of argument, discourse may become increasingly powerful and 
authoritative as it is restated and transformed in increasingly authoritative contexts” 
(Blackledge, 2006:26). Thus, recontextualisation considers the process or development of a 
text, and analyses where a certain text comes from, where the text is heading and how it gets 
there (Fairclough, 2015:38).  
     Through representation, discourse can “help produce and reproduce unequal power 
relations” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997:258), for example related to gender, and cultural 
majorities and minorities. Fairclough & Wodak (1997:276) see ideology as a process. This 
process may create certain representations of reality, and constructions of identity and ideas. 
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As echoed by several (Fairclough, 2015:108; Janks, 1997:341), ideology has its strongest 
effect when it is made invisible, and once it has become naturalised. Discourse or ideology 
may for example be presented as ‘common sense’, as: “[t]here is a constant endeavour on the 
part of those who have power to try to impose an ideological common sense which holds for 
everyone” (Fairclough, 2015:108). Through ‘naturalisation’ of discourse, the ideas it contains 
will no longer be seen as arbitrary (Fairclough, 2015:113), but rather be seen as ‘natural’. The 
dominant discourse then becomes so dominant that it outweighs everything else: 
[i]n this sense, common sense in its ideological dimension is itself an effect of power. 
What comes to be common sense is thus in large measure determined by who 
exercises power and domination in a society or a social institution. (Fairclough, 
2015:113). 
 
The theories and concepts discussed above function as a theoretical foundation in this study. 
The next section provides a more concrete description of the employed method.  
 
3.3 Practical method  
This study analyses parts of a relatively large set of material, as this was considered to give a 
more wide-ranging image of the political climate. Although most parts of the material6 have 
been reviewed; all content will not be closely studied due to the limited scope of the present 
work.  
     In this analysis, the 23 texts included in the material were read through, and potentially 
relevant parts were marked. The number of occurrences of the different strategies was also 
roughly noted, in order to get an idea of the frequency of usage in the British and Swedish 
debate. Personal notes were then compared to arguments, strategies and concepts identified in 
previous research, and categories to use for the more thorough analysis were created. A 
couple of examples were then chosen (presented and discussed in section 4) to represent the 
strategies connected to these categories. As this is a fairly small study, it could only examine a 
selected number of arguments and strategies. Naturally, there are certain topics that this essay 
will not be able to discuss. The categories employed in this study are also quite wide, partly 
                                                      
6 Some of the proposals were very long and concerned many different issues, and some sections did not at all 
relate to citizenship or citizenship testing. These sections were thus excluded. However, all parts believed to 
concern the relevant topic were reviewed.  
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including arguments that in a more elaborate essay could have been examined separately, for 
example the topic of ‘the work line’ (Swe. arbetslinjen) 7 and the argument of language 
demands benefitting women (as concerns equality), discussed in other studies (Blackledge, 
2006).  
     The first category employed in the analysis of this study will be called ‘negative 
representation of the immigrant’. Van Dijk et al. state that discourse concerning immigration 
is typically not topicalized as positive, or even as neutral. Instead, they claim, immigration is 
commonly represented as a problem, or a threat to a perceived ‘us’ (van Dijk et al., 
1997:168). This stereotype, including ethnic prejudices and racism, is then reproduced 
through discourse (van Dijk et al., 1997:144). Van Dijk et al. also argue that this may also 
occur in a political discourse, although in a “somewhat more subdued style” (van Dijk et al., 
1997:169), stating that: 
One main strategy […] is to enact ethnic conflict, polarization and dominance by 
presenting the others in negative terms and us in positive terms (while at the same 
time denying or downplaying our negative characteristics, especially racism) (van 
Dijk et al., 1997:165).  
 
This relates to the concept of ‘apparent denial’ (van Dijk et al., 1997), which will also be 
reviewed in this section. Van Dijk et al. explain apparent denial as “the standard disclaimer 
[…] (‘We have nothing against X …’) […] usually followed by but, introducing something 
negative we say about them” (van Dijk et al., 1997:170). Thus, an argument that starts off 
with a positive clause, for example “den[ying] prejudice or racism”, then continuing with a 
‘but’ clause, “invariably saying or implying something negative about minorities” (van Dijk 
et al., 1997:170). In this way, a text can state something about its position, or protect itself 
against some accusation, while still arguing within the discourse it formally denies. The text is 
thus reversing, and the denial is “immediately flouted” (van Dijk et al., 1997:170). These 
theories make out the basis of this first category.  
     The next category will explore the strategy of stressing the advantages for those mostly 
affected by an action, in this case newcomers affected by citizenship testing. This strategy is 
employed in Blackledge’s study (2006:35), referred to as ‘topos of advantage’. Blackledge 
                                                      
7 A Swedish principle stressing the importance of work and the avoidance of economical allowance, also 
relevant to the civic integration policy.  
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found that this move was “invoked to argue that language tests are a good thing, because if 
‘people’ take them, they will achieve greater economic and social integration” (Blackledge, 
2006:35). This strategy is also related to the concept of ‘apparent empathy’, as described by 
van Dijk et al. (1997). Van Dijk et al. state that a move of apparent empathy is used to 
emphasise the benefits of the ‘victims’, i.e. those who are negatively affected by an action 
(according to the analyst). This specific definition, however, is a bit difficult to confirm in 
some contexts, as one must presume the author’s intention, in this case, that he/she does not 
really believe that the so called ‘victim’ would be benefitted by the action. Janks (1997) 
argues that discriminatory, racist, sexists or classist discourse, may at times not be a conscious 
choice from the author/s, saying that “I would rather argue that as members of a society we 
are constituted in and by the available discourses and that they speak through us – it is as if 
the discourse of racist/paternalism chooses the […] writers” (Janks 1997: 338). With this view 
in mind, this category will here be named ‘benefit of the immigrant’, in order not to make 
assumptions about intention.  
     The third category will look for signs of the ‘civic integration policy trend’, which has 
already been described in section 2.1. As discussed, this policy is characterized by 
assimilationist and elitist tendencies, as well as the view that the immigrants should be 
responsible for their own integration (Blackledge, 2006:30) (Byrne, 2017:334), and the idea 
of citizenship as a ‘reward’ (Byrne, 2017:328). These features are here combined with the 
concept of the ‘super citizen’, as depicted by Byrne (2017:334), as it is judged as comparable.  
     The final category somewhat differs from the others in that it will examine the rhetoric in 
one specific event. The rhetoric explored is that used in arguments concerning those who are, 
or would be, exempted from citizenship testing. This event was chosen because it was 
considered to illustrate a disparity in ‘tone’ between the British and the Swedish debate. 
The categories employed will thus be: 
• Negative representation of the immigrant  
• Benefit of the immigrant 
• The civic integration policy trend  
• Example of differing ‘tones’ in the Swedish and British debate  
 
These categories will, as can be expected with such labels, overlap and interfuse.  
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4. Results & discussion 
This section presents and discusses examples considered to illustrate the characteristics of the 
categories listed above. While not all examples specifically mention citizenship testing in the 
illustrated instances, all arguments occur in the debate concerning citizenship and/or language 
testing, and are thus considered relevant.  
 
4.1 Negative representation of the immigrant 
The topic of ‘negative representation of the immigrant’ was identified in both the British and 
the Swedish debate, however more frequently and more evidently in the first mentioned. One 
example that illustrates the concept of apparent denial as described by van Dijk et al. 
(1997:144), is this passage from Damian Green’s speech, Immigration: Damian Green’s 
speech on family migration, published in 2011: 
Ex. 1: 
“We welcome those who want to make a life here with their family, who want to work 
hard and contribute to their local community. That is the type of family migration to 
the UK that we want to see. 
But too often in the past the family route has been abused as a means to bypass our 
immigration laws. 
And too often, we have seen family migrants without the means to support 
themselves, unable and on occasion unwilling to integrate into British life” 
 
Initially, this arguments state that we are open to immigration, and that people coming to the 
country are welcome. Thus painting a positive picture of the ‘us’, while also stating to be 
positively set towards immigration, as long as conditions of hard work and contribution are 
met. However, the next sentence introduces a ‘but’ clause, where the argument turns, stating 
that an implicitly implied ‘generosity’, has been abused. The final sentence also states that on 
occasion family migrants are unwilling to integrate, also contributing to a negative 
representation. In the same speech, Green also declares that: 
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Ex. 2: 
“… if you have no interest in this country and its way of life, if you are coming here to 
live off benefits, don’t come in the first place. We want a system that is fair to 
migrants and the public, that ensures migrants are able to integrate in British life and 
are not a burden on the taxpayer.” 
This statement reinforces the negative portrayal, claiming that immigrants are coming to the 
UK to take advantage of the system and to live off benefits. In the second sentence Green is 
also stating that we want a fair system, both to migrants and the public, ensuring that it is for 
the benefit of all, while simultaneously creating two camps, where migrants, supposedly 
including immigrant residents, are not part of the public. This example also somewhat 
exemplifies an assimilationist view, since it is stated that it is solely the migrant who is 
supposed to integrate into British life, and moreover, not be a burden on the taxpayer. Both 
the assimilationist view, and a further reinforcement of the negative portrayal described above 
can also be seen in the news story New life in the UK test goes live, published in 2013, where 
Mark Harper states: 
Ex. 3: 
We’ve stripped out mundane information about water meters, how to find train 
timetables, and using the internet [sic]. The new test rightly focuses on values and 
principles at the heart of being British. Instead of telling people how to claim benefits 
it encourages participation in British life. 
 
This statement concerns the new version of the civics tests, the Life in the UK test, where the 
content of the tests were changed, from having focused on information concerning practical 
societal skills to focusing on history, culture and values (Byrne, 2017:328), as discussed in 
section 2.1. In this example, this modification is justified by saying that the previous 
information included was mundane. Testing practical skills are thus portrayed as excessive, 
and instead the importance of being able to adjust to the majority culture is stressed. Negative 
representation is also prominent in this statement, in saying that the new test encourages 
participation in British life, instead of telling people how to claim benefits. Once again, this 
repeats the scenario where immigrants are assumed to abuse the system.  
     This rather explicit construction of negative representation of the ‘other’, as seen in 
example 1-3, does not seem to be common in the Swedish debate. The exceptions are the 
proposals published by the Swedish Democrats. The Swedish Democrats are a social-
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conservative, nationalist party, commonly seen as a bit of a deviant among Swedish political 
parties. The discourse and rhetoric used in proposals by the Swedish Democrats can thus be 
assumed to differ a bit from the other three parties included. In A responsible immigration-
policy [my translation] (transl. 8) from 2017/18, Jimmie Åkesson (SD) states that:  
Ex. 4: 
Unfortunately many people have been able to become Swedish citizens without 
feeling either fellowship or loyalty to Sweden, and without having any ambition to 
contribute to what is best for society. Sweden’s, in comparison to other countries, 
low demands in combination with a strong and well established welfare system has 
made our country especially attractive to those who first handily seek generous 
safety systems rather than a new home country. Through demands of quid pro quo 
for citizenship the importance of citizenship increases, simultaneously as it reduces 
the risk of people coming to Sweden only to enjoy social benefits, or for those who 
cannot abide the laws, to be approved for citizenship. [My translation] (transl. 9) 
 
In this statement, Åkesson echoes the arguments made in the British examples (1-3). He 
describes how Sweden’s well established welfare system attracts those who first handily seek 
generous safety systems, stating that this, in turn, has led to many people becoming Swedish 
citizens without feeling loyalty to Sweden. This statement again depicts migrants as abusers 
of the system, and suggests raised demands for citizenship as a remedy for this alleged issue. 
However, as stated, this argument was not common among the other Swedish parties. This 
might suggest that the Swedish debate, with the exception of the Swedish Democrats, display 
a higher aspiration to sound inclusive and non-discriminatory. 
 
4.2 Benefit of the immigrant 
While the previous strategy was more visible in the British debate, the strategy of talking of 
‘the benefit of the migrant’ was found to be especially evident in the Swedish debate. In the 
British material, this argument appeared to be quite sparse or subdued. In a written statement 
to Parliament, Written ministerial statement on English language requirement, from 2010, 
Theresa May writes: 
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Ex. 5: 
This new English requirement for spouses will help promote the economic well-
being of the UK, for example by encouraging integration and protecting public 
services. It will assist in removing cultural barriers, broaden opportunities for 
migrants and help to ensure that they are equipped to play full part in British life. 
This statement does say that an English requirement would broaden opportunities for 
migrants, and help them to play full part in British life, thus speaking of advantages for this 
specific group. However, it also emphasises that it would promote the economic well-being of 
the UK, for example by protecting public services, which restricts the argument. This was 
quite typical for these types of arguments in the British debate. Contrastively, a much more 
elaborate reasoning as to why immigrants would be benefitted by citizenship tests was seen in 
the Swedish proposals. This is most evident in the proposal Language – important for 
integration [my translation] (transl. 10), written by Annelie Enochson (KD) in 2007/08: 
Ex. 6: 
Lastly, it is important to point out that it is of humanitarian reasons that language and 
civics demands for citizenship are implemented. It is to side with the weak, and to 
give an incentive to an inclusion and welcoming to the new country of residence. 
Language skills lead to employment, and employment to integration. This, in turn, 
leads to understanding and bridge-building but also more income of taxation, which 
leads to more money for healthcare, school and welfare. Those who come to Sweden 
should feel welcome and be included in our society. Language and civics skills are 
important keys to integration, as language skills will pave the way towards 
employment. [My translation] (transl. 11) 
 
In this example, it seems important for the author to emphasize that it would be of 
humanitarian reasons that citizenship testing would be implemented, stressing that this would 
be to side with the weak. This type of argument is also resonated in Language skills to be 
granted Swedish citizenship [my translation] (transl. 6), published in 2011/12, by Marietta de 
Pourbaix-Lundin (M): 
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Ex. 7: 
The fact that refugees or immigrants are not learning Swedish well enough is a serious 
societal problem, and not just an issue of school or education. It also concerns societal 
participation, how you can affect your own life, how you communicate with for 
example day care, school and care for the elderly, and how to make your voice heard 
in a political assembly. To not understand the language poses a hindrance to the 
participation in a country’s democratic development. [My translation] (transl. 12) 
 
This statement argues for practical benefits of knowledge in the majority language, stressing 
concerns such as communication with day care and care for the elderly, and political and 
societal participation. This argument was found in the British debate as well (Green, English 
tests for partners, 2010), however that was before the change of content of the citizenship 
tests in the UK. Since this change, this argument has been exchanged, as seen in example 3, 
perhaps also implying a trend towards a stricter rhetoric on this issue. 
 
4.3 Civic integration policy trend  
The view of citizenship as a ‘reward’ or as a ‘privilege’, something that should be ‘earned’, or 
talk of ‘upgrading’ citizenship was found to be common in the analysed material. These 
arguments were identified in both the Swedish and the British texts. However, this specific 
instance of the ‘civic integration policy’ was more commonly occurring in the Swedish 
material. In Budget proposition for 2018 [my translation] (transl. 15), 2017/18), Oscar 
Sjöstedt (SD) writes that:  
Ex. 8: 
Nor is citizenship in our country a given right, but a privilege. A verification that 
acknowledges longing and achievement, demands responsibility, but offers rights and 
possibilities. Open for those who seek and achieve it, regardless of background, but 
with reservation for those who have done their duty and demanded their right. An 
acknowledgement that you have become a part of the Swedish nation, culturally and 
territorially. A contract showing you have followed local customs and tied your 
loyalty to the country. [My translation] (transl. 16) 
 
This clearly exemplifies the views ascribed to this category, in saying that citizenship is not a 
given right, but a privilege, stressing the importance of duty, responsibility and loyalty. It also 
promotes the assimilationist perspective, saying citizenship is a contract ensuring that you 
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have followed local customs, confirming Joppke’s “when in Rome, do as the Romans” 
(2007:3) argument (as discussed in section 2.1). As previously mentioned, the Swedish 
Democrats might be expected to deviate from the other parties in certain respects. However, a 
similar argument to that used in example 8, can be viewed in Empowerment, work and 
equality – liberal integration-policy [my translation] (transl. 17) from 2005/06, written by 
Lars Leijonborg et al. (L):  
Ex. 9: 
Thus, becoming a Swedish citizen should be something desirable. Citizenship should 
be an acknowledgement of having met a number of criteria offering certain 
advantages. If this happens, it can have positive effects on the integration process even 
at an early stage. With this view, it is natural that the granting of citizenship in itself 
should be linked to a certain solemnity. [My translation] (transl. 18) 
 
Although this statement from The Liberals might seem less harsh than the previous example 
(8), it still shares the view that citizenship should be seen as an acknowledgement, something 
desirable, and that it should be connected to a certain solemnity. This understanding is also 
repeated in a later proposal from 2018, Liberal integration-policy: Strengthen the individual 
and counteract parallel societies [my translation] (transl. 19), where Jan Björklund et al. (L) 
writes:  
Ex. 10: 
To voluntarily choose to become a citizen in Sweden is the outmost proof of wanting to 
become part of our country’s future. Citizenship is the end of the integration process and 
not a step on the way. We want to upgrade the meaning of citizenship, which we argue 
promotes integration. [My translation] (transl. 20) 
 
In this example, Björklund et al. clearly conveys the view of citizenship as the end of the 
integration process, as opposed to citizenship as a part of the integration process, considered a 
common denominator among countries with citizenship testing (Globaliseringsrådet, 2008). 
      The fact that these arguments are more frequently occurring in the Swedish debate is not 
surprising, as the Swedish advocates are arguing for an amendment, i.e. an introduction of 
citizenship testing. The supporters thus need to justify this proposed change. The argument 
was also used in a similar way in the British material, in justifying the extension of the law, as 
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in the press release from 2010 (Migrants marrying UK citizens must now learn English), 
where Theresa May writes: 
Ex. 7: 
‘[i]t is a privilege to come to the UK and that is why I am committed to raising the bar 
for migrants and ensuring that those who benefit from being in Britain contribute to 
our society. 
 
The argument of citizenship, or even the arrival to a country in itself, being a privilege is here 
used to justify the decision of raising the bar for migrants.  
     Another element included in the category of civic integration policy, is the concepts of the 
‘super citizen’, as depicted by Byrne (2017:334), and the ‘migration control’ as an elitist and 
selective process, as described by Joppke (2007:8). Both these elements are explicit in the 
British material, but not visible in the Swedish debate, suggesting another disparity. In the 
Press release Government looks to break link between temporary and permanent migration 
from 2011, Green writes: 
Ex. 11: 
‘We want the brightest and best workers to come to the UK, make a strong 
contribution to our economy while they are here, and then return home.’ 
[…] 
‘A small number of exceptional migrants will be able to stay permanently but for the 
majority, coming here to work will not lead automatically to settlement in the UK.’ 
 
As reviewed in section 2.2 of this study, this argument has previously been discussed as an 
unspoken motif in the British debate (Blackledge, 2006; Han et al., 2010). However, in this 
example, the elitism is explicit, as it openly states that we want the brightest, best and most 
exceptional migrants. The argument of immigration control is even more visible in the next 
example, from New life in the UK test goes live, written by Mark Harper in 2013: 
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Ex. 12: 
The new test is part of the government’s reforms to the immigration system looking 
at helping reduce net migration to sustainable levels, while ensuring that we attract 
the best migrants from across the world. 
In this example, Harper openly states that the new citizenship test is a step in a policy aiming 
to reduce immigration, while also maintaining the expressed aspiration to attract the best 
migrants. As mentioned, these arguments are not visible in the Swedish proposals. Rather, 
these seem to make an effort to reassure the reader that this is certainly not the purpose of 
tests, and again stresses that the tests would be introduced for humanitarian reasons. The 
following example from Swedish citizenship [my translation] (transl. 21), written by Torkild 
Strandberg (L) and published in 2014/15 illustrates this: 
Ex. 13: 
Society should view new and old Swedes in the same way, and have the same 
demands and expectations on everyone regardless of background. We should 
assume that the person arriving to a new society wants to create his or her own life 
with a new language and a job at a new labour market. [My translation] (transl. 22) 
This statement also differs from examples 1-3, presented in the first category, as it states that 
we should assume willingness and competence of the immigrant, conveying a positive 
representation rather than a negative one. 
4.4 Example of differing ‘tones’ in the Swedish and British debate 
Along similar lines, a further disparity found in the British and the Swedish debate, was the 
rhetoric used concerning those who are, or would be, exempted of citizenship testing. When 
discussed in the Swedish proposals, the authors are using words such as of course and 
naturally, those unfit for tests would be exempted, emphasising that generous and human 
principles must hold, as seen in the following two examples: Language – important for 
integration [my translation] (transl. 23), written by Annelie Enochson (KD) from 2007/08, 
and Empowerment, work and equality – liberal integration-policy [my translation] (transl. 
17), written by Lars Leijonborg et al. (L) in 2005/06: 
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Ex. 14: 
If you are illiterate or a dyslectic it will be possible to go through an oral examination, 
after having participated in education hours. Elderly people or people with severe 
handicaps will naturally be exempted from the language education, and will of course still 
be able to obtain citizenship, as generous and human principles must hold. [My translation] 
(transl. 24) 
 
Ex. 15: 
Of course there will be exceptions, for example people with handicaps or elderly people 
who are illiterate when they arrive here, or are having a very hard time to learn a new 
language, but still should be able to become citizens. [My translation] (transl. 25) 
 
In the British material, it is contrastively emphasised that it would have to be exceptional 
compassionate circumstances; that there could be exceptions, but the vast majority will not be 
excused, as seen in the following example from English tests for partners – English language 
requirement (article), written by Damian Green in 2010: 
Ex. 16: 
When there are exceptional compassionate circumstances, such as a learning disability, 
there could be an exemption. But for the vast majority of men and women joining their 
partners here in the UK, speaking English will help make everyday life easier… 
 
These instances thus show two differing tones in the Swedish and the British discourse, also 
discussed in section 4.1 concerning negative representation, where the Swedish proposals 
seem careful to sound inclusive and generous, while the rhetoric in the British announcements 
conveys a stricter approach.   
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5. Conclusion 
In the UK, where citizenship testing has been an established concept for decades, the political 
debate is no longer concerned with questions about whether or not citizenship tests should 
exist, but rather about who it should concern, and what the tests should include. In Sweden, 
where citizenship testing is not yet a recognised concept, the debate mostly focuses on 
arguing for an introduction of language demands, describing how this would favour society.  
     Specific to the British debate was that it explicitly described a wish to reduce immigration 
to the UK, in direct connection to citizenship testing. It also argued for the new focus on 
history, culture and values, and the importance of a common ground among people residing in 
Britain. It also differed from the Swedish debate, in openly articulating a wish to attract the 
‘best migrants’, thus corroborating Joppke’s claim (2007:8) about selectivism and elitism in 
the migration process of the civic integration policy. The fact that this sort of argument does 
not occur in the Swedish debate might indicate that the impact of the civic integration policy 
is indeed not as visible in the Swedish political discourse (Borevi, 2014) as it is in the UK. 
However, this is not surprising as Sweden is still officially connected to its multicultural 
ideology and previous opposition to citizenship tests. Advocates of citizenship tests in 
Sweden are thus arguing in a different context than those in the UK, and must justify their 
claim for change. 
     Possibly as a result of this, the Swedish political debate seems to put a great deal of effort 
on arguing for the positive effects of a common language, and of language demands, with a 
clear focus on why it would be beneficial for the immigrants. Many proposals are careful to 
point out that the tests would not be exclusionary and that they would not function as an 
immigration control, emphasising humanitarian reasons. This may be done in order to respond 
to a presumed critique of the concept of ‘testing’, and the issue of unfair assessment 
previously prescribed to this concept (as discussed in section 2.3).  
      This milder approach in the Swedish debate may also be seen in how the two debates 
discussed the exemption of certain applicants. In these instances, the rhetoric differed as the 
British debate conveyed a stricter attitude, while the Swedish debate conveyed a softer 
attitude. This difference in tone may also be attributed to the concept of recontextualisation. 
The debate in the UK is perhaps less concerned about potential problems with, or ideological 
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concerns about citizenship testing than the Swedish debate, as citizenship testing has become 
an accepted and normalised concept in this context. Since arguments for demands on 
citizenship applicants have occurred during a long time in the UK, and reappeared numerous 
times in different authoritative settings, these ideas may thus have become established as 
‘common sense’, as discussed by Fairclough (2015:108), and no longer need to be justified or 
explained.   
     However, despite these disparities, similarities between the Swedish and British material 
were also found. These entailed the instances where citizenship was spoken of as a reward, 
privilege, or as the ‘end of the integration process’, as previously identified as common traits 
among those advocating citizenship tests (Globaliseringsrådet, 2008). There were also some 
similarities between the discourse in the British material, and that of the Swedish Democrats, 
especially as concerns negative representation of the immigrant. This strategy was, however, 
specific for the Swedish Democrats, and was not evident among the other Swedish parties.  
     In conclusion, both similarities and disparities were spotted in the two debates concerning 
citizenship testing in Sweden and in the UK. The most striking common trait was the view of 
citizenship as an acknowledgement, rewarded as a symbolic mark at the end of an integration 
process. As regards disparities, the British discourse came across as overall stricter than the 
Swedish discourse, which appeared to be milder and more careful to sound inclusive and non-
discriminatory. This concerned both the use of rhetoric (as seen in section 4.4) and the use of 
strategies such as negative representation (as seen in section 4.1), as well as talk about the 
benefit of the immigrant (as seen in section 4.2). This may be attributed to the differing 
contexts in which these two debates occur, as demands on citizenship applicants have long 
been an established concept in the UK, while in Sweden, an introduction of a policy on 
citizenship testing would entail an amendment, and perhaps imply a deviation from a 
previously established ideology of multiculturalism. 
     There are many angles of this topic that this study has not been able to examine on account 
of its limited scope. In a more elaborate study, it would have been interesting to complement a 
qualitative study with a quantitative one, examining the number of occurrences of certain 
strategies in the two political debates, as well as the number of proposals being presented in 
the Swedish debate. It would be interesting to see future research on the development in 
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Sweden, since it currently seems to be in a process of change, so as to further examine a 
potential movement towards a civic integration policy.  
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Appendices 
 
1. Translations  
1. “Språk, krav och medborgarskap”. 
2. “av majoritetsbefolkningen uppfattas som (mer) främmande”  
3. ”Med en underförstådd uppfattning att medborgarskapet innebär tillhörighet till en nationell 
gemenskap kan kanske en allt mer markant etnisk heterogenitet uppfattas som ett hot mot 
själva grundidén.”  
4. “erkännande av att man uppfyllt ett antal kriterier” 
5. “förknippat med en viss högtidlighet” 
6. ”Språkkunskaper för att beviljas svenskt medborgarskap” 
7. “Vore det så att det bl.a. krävdes grundläggande kunskaper i svenska språket för att kunna 
erhålla svenskt medborgarskap skulle säkert fler mer aktivt delta i sfi-undervisningen. 
Flyktingmottagandet och sfi-undervisningen behöver reformeras, dels för att korta vägen till 
egen försörjning, dels för att överföra grundläggande värderingar till de människor som 
kommer till vårt land.” 
8. ”En ansvarsfull invandringspolitik” 
9. ”Tyvärr har många kunnat bli svenska medborgare utan att känna vare sig samhörighet med 
eller lojalitet till Sverige, och utan att ha någon ambition att bidra till samhällets bästa. 
Sveriges, i jämförelse med andra länder, låga krav i kombination med ett starkt och väl 
förankrat välfärdssamhälle har gjort vårt land extra attraktivt för den som i första hand söker 
generösa trygghetssystem snarare än ett nytt hemland. Genom att kräva motprestation för 
medborgarskap ökar medborgarskapets betydelse, samtidigt som risken minskar för att 
personer som kommer till Sverige enbart för att åtnjuta sociala förmåner, eller som inte kan 
hålla sig inom lagens ramar, tilldelas medborgarskap.” 
10. “Språket – viktigt för integration” 
11. ”Slutligen är det viktigt att poängtera att det är av humana skäl som man inför språk- och 
samhällsutbildningskrav för medborgarskap. Det är att ställa sig på de svagas sida, att ge 
incitament till ett inkluderande och ett välkomnande in i det nya land man bosatt sig i. 
Språkkunskaper leder till arbete, och arbete till integration. Detta leder i sin tur till mer 
samförstånd och brobyggande men även mer skatteintäkter, vilket leder till mer pengar till 
vård, skola och omsorg. De som kommer till Sverige skall känna sig välkomna och inkluderas 
i vårt samhälle. Språk- och samhällskunskaper är viktiga nycklar till integration, då 
språkkunskaper bereder väg för att få jobb.” 
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12. ”Att flyktingar eller invandrare inte lär sig svenska tillräckligt bra är ett allvarligt 
samhällsproblem och inte endast en skol- eller utbildningsfråga. Det handlar även om 
delaktighet i samhället, hur man kan påverka sina egna livsförhållanden, hur man 
kommunicerar med t.ex. dagis, skola och äldrevård och hur man gör sin röst hörd i en politisk 
församling. Att inte förstå språket utgör ett hinder mot medverkan i ett lands demokratiska 
utveckling.” 
13. ”Krav på svenska för medborgarskap” 
14. ”Att inte försäkra sig om att varje person som gör det här valet har tillräckliga verktyg för att 
fritt kunna kommunicera med sina grannar, arbetsgivare och myndigheter är att göra våra nya 
svenskar en björntjänst. Att, som i så många andra länder, ställa krav på fullgoda 
språkkunskaper stänger ingen ute. Det innebär istället att man kan bjuda in alla att delta – på 
riktigt.” 
15. “Budgetpropositionen för 2018” 
16. “Medborgarskapet i vårt land är inte heller en självklar rättighet, utan ett privilegium. En 
handling som erkänner längtan och prestation, kräver plikt, men ger rättigheter och 
möjligheter. Öppet för den som söker och uppnår det, oavsett bakgrund, men förbehållet den 
som gjort sin plikt och krävt sin rätt. Ett erkännande om att man blivit en del av den svenska 
nationen, kulturellt och territoriellt. Ett kontrakt över att man tagit seden dit man kommit och 
knutit sin lojalitet till landet. Vårt mål är att hela Sverige ska samlas, medborgarskapet 
uppvärderas och medborgarandan stärkas. I det arbetet är kultur en nyckel.” 
17. ”Egenmakt, arbete och jämlikhet – liberal integrationspolitik” 
18. ”Det ska alltså vara något eftersträvansvärt att bli svensk medborgare. Medborgarskapet ska 
vara ett erkännande av att man uppfyllt ett antal kriterier som ger vissa fördelar. Om det blir 
så, kan det ha positiva effekter redan tidigt i integrationsprocessen. Med denna syn är det 
naturligt att själva erhållandet av medborgarskapet förknippas med en viss högtidlighet.” 
19. “Liberal integrationspolitik: Stärk individen och motverka parallellsamhällen” 
20. “Att frivilligt välja att bli medborgare i Sverige är det yttersta beviset på att man vill bli en del 
av vårt lands framtid. Medborgarskapet är slutet på integrationsprocessen och inte ett steg på 
vägen. Vi vill uppvärdera medborgarskapets betydelse vilket vi menar främjar integrationen.” 
21. ”Svenskt medborgarskap” 
22. “Samhället ska ha samma syn både på nya och gamla svenskar och ska ställa samma krav och 
ha samma förväntningar på alla oavsett bakgrund. Vi ska utgå ifrån att den som kommer ny 
till ett samhälle vill skapa sig ett eget liv med ett nytt språk och ett arbete på en ny 
arbetsmarknad.” 
23. “Språket – viktigt för integration” 
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24. “Är man analfabet eller dyslektiker kan man efter att ha deltagit i undervisningstimmarna, 
genomföra en muntlig examination. Givetvis undantas personer med hög ålder eller grava 
handikapp från språkutbildningen, och dessa kan självklart erhålla medborgarskap ändå då 
generösa och humana kriterier måste gälla.” 
25. ”Det ska naturligtvis finnas undantag, exempelvis personer med handikapp eller gamla 
människor som är analfabeter när de kommer hit eller har mycket svårt att lära sig ett nytt 
språk, men ändå bör få bli medborgare.” 
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